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Abstract 
Since 2015 the Polish authorities have undertaken numerous actions subordinating the country's 
judiciary to political influence. These steps met resistance from the European Union (EU), including 
proceedings by the European Commission and at the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). 
The judgement of the ECJ in the case A.K. and Others v Sąd Najwyższy (2019) brought the situation 
to another level by empowering national courts to verify the independence of other domestic judicial 
bodies. While the ECJ empowered Polish judges to reject the domestic court-packing, the Polish state 
countered this with internal disciplinary sanctions. I discuss this tension and consider the upcoming 
conflict between the ECJ and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (‘CT’). I conclude by highlighting the 
fact that whereas Poland breaches European law, the breach will be hard to rectify due to the lack of 
independent enforcement mechanisms on the side of the EU. 
Keywords: European Law, Rule of law, Poland, European Court of Justice, the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal, the infringement procedure 
1 Introduction 
Since a landslide electoral victory in 2015 by the Law and Justice Pary (PiS) 1, Polish 
authorities have been increasing their political influence on the functioning of the 
judiciary. These actions challenge the principles of judicial independence anchored in 
Art. 19 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)2, Art. 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (‘Charter')3 and Art. 2 TEU4. So far, the EU has remained largely 
ineffective in counteracting this ‘reform’: The dialogue between the European 
Commission and the Polish government within the non-binding mechanism of the 
 
1 In the 2015 elections Law and Justice (pol. Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) won 235 out of 460 seats in the Polish 
Parliament ((“PKW | Wybory Do Sejmu RP i Senatu RP 2015” 2015)). PiS repeated its success in 2019, winning 
the same number of seats ((“Wyniki wyborów 2019 do Sejmu RP” 2019)). 
2 Art. 19 par. 2 TEU: ‘(…)Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in 
the fields covered by Union law.’ 
3 Art. 47 of the Charter: ‘(…) Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated 
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. 
(…)’ 
4 ‘Art. 2 TEU: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values 
are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 





Rule of Law Framework5 remained futile. At the same time, the requirement of 
unanimity of other member states has exposed the inherent weakness of the "nuclear" 
rule of law mechanism from Art. 7 TEU.6 On this background, the judicial procedures 
at the ECJ could be the only viable mechanism of hindering the Polish rule of law 
backsliding. 
This article discusses the clash between the European rule of law and the principle of 
primacy of European law on one side, and national law and politics on the other. After 
describing the background of the Polish rule of law debacle, I discuss the ECJ's ruling 
A.K. and Others v Sąd Najwyższy ('A.K.’ judgement) (Case C-585/18, A.K. and Others 
v Sąd Najwyższy 2019) and its consequences for safeguarding the independence of the 
Polish judiciary. One of the most critical outcomes in this respect is a conflict between 
the principle of primacy of European law and the reality created by the Polish 
government which deters the domestic courts from following the ruling of the ECJ. 
After describing the measures already undertaken by the Polish government against 
the A.K. judgement, I discuss the intended use of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
(‘CT') as a tool in shielding the Polish ‘reform’ of the judiciary from the interference 
from ECJ. Whereas from the side of the Polish state, the CT constitutes the highest 
instance of the judiciary, from the European law perspective the CT, and other state-
captured courts, are merely tools used by the state to further its policies. Thus, the 
article concludes by discussing the dynamics of the conflict between European 
jurisdiction and the Polish authorities. 
2 Background: the assault on Polish courts 
The measures applied by the Polish authorities to the national system of the judiciary 
are characteristic for illiberal democracies or authoritarian regimes (Sadurski 2019, 
242–61). Such systems aim at concentrating power in the hands of a political leader or 
organisation, and the independence of judges threatens this agenda. An authoritarian 
rule benefits from packing top judicial institutions and concentrating the politically 
significant decisions in their hands; establishing new super-courts controlled by the 
authorities; and from extending a net of formal and informal mechanisms of 
dependency which aim at controlling the ordinary courts (Sanchez Urribarri 2011; 
Solomon 2007). Through these measures, the regime avoids challenges by judicial 
independence. Additionally, the capture of courts allows to use the judiciary as a 
seemingly impartial facilitator of political changes and to strengthen the legitimacy of 
the authoritarian regime through compliant case-law (Solomon 2007, 128). 
The Polish authorities have been challenging the independence of the judiciary both 
at the level of ordinary courts and the country's highest judicial institutions (Sadurski 
2019, 58–95). These actions included illegal "cancelling" of the previous election of 
some of the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal and a set of legislative measures 
aimed at paralysing this institution. PiS blocked the functioning of the CT until the 
cadencies of the non-compliant judges have finished, and the Parliament replaced 
 
5 The Rule of Law Framework is a procedure introduced by the European Commisison in 2014. This procedure 
structures the dialogue between the Commission and the member states. However, it does not offer any binding 
mechanisms or sanctions. See: (“Rule of Law Framework” n.d.). 
6 Art. 7 TEU allows the European Council to ‘to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the 
Treaties’ in relation to a meber states which breaches the principles of the EU from art. 2 TEU. However, the 
procedure requires unanimity of other member states.  




them with candidates supported by PiS (Sadurski 2019, 116). Furthermore, the Polish 
authorities launched a comprehensive set of measures aimed at packing the country's 
Supreme Court and lower courts. These measures included extending the powers of 
the Presidents of the ordinary courts and replacing the pre-PiS court presidents with 
nominees of the Minister of Justice (Sadurski 2019, 112). 
Furthering the control over the national judiciary, the Polish Parliament enacted laws 
which created a system of disciplinary responsibility of the judges, headed by a newly 
created Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court ('Disciplinary Chamber') 
(Sadurski 2019, 110–15). The members of this Chamber were elected by the "reformed" 
National Council of the Judiciary ('NCJ'). The NCJ performs crucial functions 
regarding the supervision of the judiciary, including the competence to propose 
candidates for appointment as a judge and safeguarding the independence of courts 
and judges (The Constitution of the Republic of Poland 1997, Art. 179 and 186). 
Breaching the country's Constitution, PiS has removed the pre-2015 members of the 
NCJ and appointed its candidates (Sadurski 2019, 98–106). The NCJ then staffed the 
Disciplinary Chamber with people directly linked to PiS or its Minister of Justice (“To 
Oni Zajmą Się Przewinieniami Kolegów Po Fachu.” 2018). These actions cumulatively 
led to a situation in which PiS controls the Constitutional Tribunal and the NCJ, and 
systematically strengthens its grip on the rest of the judiciary. 
In response to the described measures by the Polish authorities, the European 
Commission initiated treaty infringement procedures at the ECJ. The impugned Polish 
rules were forcing judges of chosen courts to retire earlier than initially foreseen and 
differentiated their retirement age according to sex. A possible continuation of the 
judges' service depended then on a discretionary decision of the Republic's President 
(a PiS-politician) (Case C-619/18 European Commission v Republic of Poland 2019). 
Apart from challenging the discriminatory aspect of these solutions, the ECJ asserted 
the competence to control the independence and impartiality of national courts by 
extensively interpreting the second subparagraph of Art. 19 (1) TEU. The norm states 
that the ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal 
protection in the fields covered by Union law’. The ECJ reaffirmed its views from the 
ASJP judgement (Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v 
Tribunal de Contas 2018) and stated that because the national courts apply European 
law, Art. 19 (1) TEU warrants their independence and impartiality (Case C-192/18, 
European Commission v Republic of Poland 2019, para. 47). However, because of the 
scope and nature of the mentioned infringement procedures, the ECJ's judgements 
had left open such systematic issues as the NCJ capture, the political nominations of 
judges designated to work at the Disciplinary Chamber and the strengthened system 
of disciplinary responsibility of judges. The opportunity to rule on these matters 
presented itself with the request for a preliminary reference in the case A.K. 
3 The A.K. judgement 
The case A.K. resulted from a dispute concerning the early retirement of Polish judges 
sitting in the country's Supreme Administrative Court and the Supreme Court. New 
Polish legislation lowered the retirement age for the judges of these two courts from 
70 to 65 years. Should the judges wish to continue working after they reached the age 





among others, on a positive opinion by the NCJ. 7 Three judges have challenged the 
decisions or declarations issued in their cases and lodged actions at the Labour and 
Social Insurance Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court ('LSI Chamber’). According to 
the new legislation, affected judges should direct such claims to the Disciplinary 
Chamber. However, at the moment of lodging the claim, the authorities had not yet 
established the Disciplinary Chamber, and the case went first to the LSI Chamber 
comprising of ‘regular’ judges (not PiS-nominees). After the Disciplinary Chamber 
started functioning, the LSI Chamber was obliged to transfer the case to it. 
Nevertheless, considering the doubts surrounding the Disciplinary Chamber, the LSI 
Chamber decided to apply to ECJ for a preliminary ruling regarding the transfer of the 
case. The core of the question consisted of enquiring whether the LSI Chamber should 
interpret the European law in a way which would prevent the claims of the three judges 
from being transferred to, and decided by, the Disciplinary Chamber. 
The relevant European law in the case was Art. 19 TEU, Art. 47 of the Charter and 
Article 9(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a 
general framework for equal treatment in employment. The latter act was applicable 
in the case because the applicants based their claims, among others, on the prohibition 
of discrimination in employment on the ground of age. The Directive 2000/78/EC 
requires that the member states establish effective judicial remedies for challenging 
discriminatory treatment(Case C-585/18, A.K. and Others v Sąd Najwyższy 2019, para. 
80). This requirement then opens the gate to the assessment of the domestic judicial 
institutions in the light of European law, including the Charter.8 
In its judgement, the ECJ spelled out the requirements which apply to a judicial body 
deciding the matters of European law. The ECJ based these requirements on Art. 47 
of the Charter which states that “Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within 
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by 
law”. From this provision, ECJ derived the conclusion that the applicants in the 
domestic judicial system are entitled to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal (Case C-585/18, A.K. and Others v Sąd Najwyższy 2019, para. 120). According 
to the ECJ, “independence” means that the judges are protected from external 
intervention or pressure and should be free from direct or indirect influence affecting 
their decisions (Case C-585/18, A.K. and Others v Sąd Najwyższy 2019, para. 125). The 
requirement of Impartiality implies that the judges' behaviour and connections cannot 
raise doubts regarding their neutrality. At the same time, their objective qualities and 
events surrounding the court proceeding should also confirm its impartiality (Case C-
585/18, A.K. and Others v Sąd Najwyższy 2019, para. 128). 
The A.K. judgement underlines the importance of the principle of primacy of European 
law. This principle means that the EU law, including the European case-law, enjoy 
supremacy over domestic laws. Such an effect has significant consequences in the 
application of the A.K. judgement by the courts of the member states: Should a 
domestic court decide that a provision of national law deprives someone of adequate 
judicial protection, the court should leave such provision unapplied. Thus, when 
 
7 The statute lowering the retirement age of judges was revoked in reaction to a treaty infringement procedure at 
the ECJ in case C-619/18 (Case C-619/18 European Commission v Republic of Poland 2019) . However, this did not 
remove all the consequences of the earlier law which allowed the ECJ to proceed in the case A.K. 
8 According to Art. 51 of the Charter, the Charter applies to the Member States ‘only when they are implementing 
Union law’. This is why it is important that the case of the judges fell within the scope of European law through 
the Directive 2000/78/EC. 




national law obliges a court to transfer a case to another judicial body, the court may 
refuse to do so if the other body is not impartial (Case C-585/18, A.K. and Others v Sąd 
Najwyższy 2019, para. 156). 
In the A.K. judgement, the ECJ refrained from declaring whether the NCJ or the 
Disciplinary Chamber fulfil the requirements of independence or impartiality. Instead, 
the ECJ empowered the referring court to decide these questions. Nevertheless, the 
judgement contains several remarks indicating that the doubts regarding the 
impartiality of the Disciplinary Chamber are justified. These indices include the fact 
that the authorities extraordinarily shortened the term in office of the previous NCJ's 
and that political authorities now elect 23 of its 25 members (Case C-585/18, A.K. and 
Others v Sąd Najwyższy 2019, para. 143). Furthermore, the ECJ stressed that the 
domestic court should consider all aspects of the functioning of the Disciplinary 
Chamber. These include the lowering the retirement age of the judges of the Supreme 
Court (which the Disciplinary Chamber is a part of), and forming the Disciplinary 
Chamber solely from newly appointed judges (Case C-585/18, A.K. and Others v Sąd 
Najwyższy 2019, pts. 147–150). The judgement further states that although one or 
other of the factors taken individually may escape criticism, the domestic court needs 
to see them in context and evaluate them as a whole (Case C-585/18, A.K. and Others 
v Sąd Najwyższy 2019, para. 142). Should the verification give negative results, then  
"Article 47 of the Charter and Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/78 must be 
interpreted as precluding cases concerning the application of EU law from 
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court which is not an independent 
and impartial tribunal, within the meaning of the former provision”(Case C-
585/18, A.K. and Others v Sąd Najwyższy 2019, para. 154). 
In other words, the domestic court should ignore the domestic provision, which asks 
it to transfer a case to a judicial body which is not impartial or independent. 
4 Polish courts and the principle of primacy 
The A.K. judgement presumes that the EU and the Polish legal systems constitute a 
unity characterised by the primacy of European law. This assumption follows from the 
fact that Poland ratified the European Treaties and accepted the European acquis. As 
the court re-stated in the ruling, the EU law stems from a source of law independent 
from the member states and thus enjoys primacy and direct effect in the member states 
(Case C-585/18, A.K. and Others v Sąd Najwyższy 2019, para. 156) . However, the 
Polish case counters this assumption and exposes the gap in rule enforcement by the 
EU: Because the EU does not have a law enforcement apparatus itself, it relies on the 
cooperation from the side of the domestic systems. This reliance is problematic in the 
case of Poland. 
The EU sanctions the breaches of European law by its member states via the 
infringement procedure from Art. 258 TFEU. This procedure leads to only a general 
responsibility of these states. In effect, breaches of the law are "penalised" with delay 
needed to run the European procedure, and no individual (personal) responsibility 
takes place. Meanwhile, the individuals who, in the conflict between the EU and a 
member state, follow European law and challenge the national system, face direct 





law, with its remote and general sanctions, competes with national norms sanctioned 
by direct and individual consequences attached to their breach. 
In the previous applications of the principle of primacy, the ECJ obliged the national 
judges to disregard domestic laws of governments which recognised their obligations 
from European law. In the Polish case, judges face systemic hostility of the state's 
administration towards the EU. Consequently, a domestic judge who applies European 
law contrary to the expectations of national authorities no longer executes the law (in 
the eyes of the member state) but breaches it. Accordingly, the judges make themselves 
vulnerable to sanctions imposed by the member state. Considering this reality, the 
theoretical construct of the A.K. judgement empowers the national courts to undertake 
a seemingly suicidal mission. Even though a judge who applies the A.K. judgement will 
behave correctly, she will face a national system aimed against her. The correctness in 
applying European law is thus balanced by human needs and fears of judges, such as 
the need to earn their living, the maintaining their judicial career or the wish to avoid 
disciplinary proceedings or criminal charges from the side of a corrupt system. 
Therefore, it is doubtful that Polish judges, or other judges in authoritarian regimes 
within the EU, would widely apply the A.K. ruling. Such an application would require 
an introduction of an effective sanctioning mechanism on the European level to 
protect the national judges. This unfulfilled need indicates that the A.K. judgement is 
just a step in counteracting the Polish court-packing and not a tool to be applied by the 
domestic courts. Still, the case potentially delegitimises and dismantles the Polish 
system of the judiciary established by PiS, as explained in the next section. 
5 European law and purely domestic context 
Although the A.K. judgement concentrates on the interpretation of Art. 47 of the 
Charter, the reasoning regarding the requirement of independence and impartiality of 
courts also applies to Art 19 (1) TEU. According to the ECJ, Art. 19 (1) TEU "is a general 
principle of EU law which is now enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter" (Case C-
585/18, A.K. and Others v Sąd Najwyższy 2019, para. 168) . After the A.K. judgement 
it is clear that the former norm cannot be infringed without infringing the latter. The 
requirements of impartiality and independence always apply, irrespective whether a 
case considers European law. If a member state maintains courts which are not 
independent or impartial, it breaches Art. 19 TEU irrespective of the context of an 
individual case because all domestic courts may decide issues of European law (Case 
C-619/18 European Commission v Republic of Poland 2019, para. 56).9 This 
conclusion leads to significant consequences not only for assessing the breach of law 
on the side of the member state but also for the conduct of judges in purely domestic 
cases. 
Because all domestic authorities are obliged to sincerely cooperate with the EU and 
support the achievement of its goals, the domestic courts also should refrain from 
supporting mechanisms and institutions aimed at breaching European law. In the 
Polish context, it is notorious that the Polish NCJ is a governmental body not fulfilling 
its judicial function; that the Polish Constitutional Tribunal is a political extension of 
the authorities and not a court; and that the Disciplinary Chamber is a jurisdictional 
hoax. Thus, other courts, both Polish and from other member states, should refrain 
 
9 Case C-619/18, European Commission v Republic of Poland, EU:C:2019:531, para 56. 




from cooperating with these bodies and effectively ignore their judgements or 
decisions. Consequently, the case-law of the ECJ leads to the dismantling of the Polish 
system of the judiciary established by PiS. However, before this theoretical  construct 
has practical consequences, the not insignificant obstacle in the form of the resistance 
from the Polish authorities needs to be overcome. 
6 Counteracting the A.K. judgement 
The competence granted by the A.K. judgement to the referring court has been 
executed by the referring LSI Chamber of the Supreme Court to the detriment of the 
Disciplinary Chamber of the same court. The LSI Chamber decided the NCJ is neither 
independent nor impartial. Instead, the NCJ is directly dependent on the executive 
and legislative. For this reason, the Disciplinary Chamber, which the NCJ constituted, 
shares the NCJ’s faults and is not a court according to European, and hence, the Polish 
law. Consequently, the LSI Chamber refused to transfer the case to the Disciplinary 
Chamber and disapplied the national rules of jurisdiction (Case III PO 7/18 2019). 
A few days after the A.K. ruling, a judge of a District Court attempted to follow the ECJ 
judgement and verify the impartiality and independence of the National Council of the 
Judiciary. Shortly afterwards, the judge’s supervisor (President of his court) 
suspended him from his duties (“Sędzia Paweł Juszczyszyn zawieszony.” 2019). The 
disciplinary prosecutor raised charges against the judge, including an allegation of 
committing a crime of overstepping his competencies (“Komunikat Rzecznika 
Dyscyplinarnego sędziego Piotra Schaba” 2019). 
The Polish authorities demonstrated a clear intention to thwart any further 
applications of the A.K. ruling in Poland. The Minister of Justice announced that the 
ECJ could not decide about the Polish “reform” of courts (“Wyrok TSUE Ws. Sądu 
Najwyższego. Zbigniew Ziobro: Trybunał Orzekł to, Czego Się Spodziewałem” 2019). 
At the same time, PiS modified the statutory regime of disciplinary control over Polish 
Judges (“Disciplining Law”) (Ustawa z dnia 20 grudnia 2019 r. o zmianie ustawy – 
Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych, ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym oraz niektórych 
innych ustaw 2019). The new law directly contradicts the A.K. judgement by 
prohibiting the courts from questioning the legality of other courts and tribunals, as 
well as of other constitutional, controlling or law enforcement bodies (Ustawa z dnia 
20 grudnia 2019 r. o zmianie ustawy – Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych, 
ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym oraz niektórych innych ustaw 2019 Art. 1 point 19 ). 
Additionally, according to the law, the judges can be punished for actions or lack of 
actions which would seriously impair the functioning of the judiciary; actions which 
would question the legality of the nomination of a judge; for public activity which 
cannot be reconciled with the principles of independence of the judges and courts; and 
for infringing the dignity of the judge's position (Ustawa z dnia 20 grudnia 2019 r. o 
zmianie ustawy – Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych, ustawy o Sądzie 
Najwyższym oraz niektórych innych ustaw 2019 Art. 1 points 32-33). The catalogue 
of penalties for these delicts includes removing the judge from her office (Prawo o 
Ustroju Sądów Powszechnych 2001 Art. 109). 
The current procedural design of the disciplinary system further strengthens the grip 
of PiS on the judiciary. The disciplinary procedure in the first instance takes place in 
the disciplinary courts at the courts of appeals and, in the second and final instance, 





The President of the Disciplinary Chamber indicates the court of the first instance in a 
given case (Prawo o Ustroju Sądów Powszechnych 2001 Art. 110 § 3). Moreover, the 
prosecutor in such cases is a functionary designated by the Minister of Justice (Prawo 
o Ustroju Sądów Powszechnych 2001 Art. 112 § 3). 
The Polish Ministry of Justice endorsed the Disciplining Law (“Stanowisko 
Ministerstwa Sprawiedliwości w sprawie zmian dotyczących aktywności sędziów” 
2019). The Ministry stated that the project was necessary to rectify the chaos created 
by the A.K. ruling and served the purpose of the ruling's implementation. The 
statement also underlined the exclusive competence of the CT to control the legality of 
laws within Poland. In this context, the Polish Minister of Justice stated that according 
to the Polish Constitution, the final decision regarding the organisation of the Polish 
judiciary belongs to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. The respective procedure is 
already pending at the CT (Procedure K/718). 
7 Breach of European law 
The activities of the Polish state concerning the A.K. ruling are a violation of European 
law. Firstly, the breach consisted of forming a judiciary system in which European law 
is being actually or potentially applied by courts lacking independence and thus 
violating Art. 47 of the Charter and Art. 19 (1) TEU. Secondly, Poland actively pursues 
the goal of depriving a judgement of the ECJ of its force. This activity contradicts the 
country’s duty of sincere cooperation enshrined in Art. 4 (3) TEU, according to which 
member states shall assist the EU in carrying out its tasks. 
Polish courts, which are theoretically co-responsible for the enforcement of European 
law, can hardly rectify the described breaches because of the described court-packing 
scheme. However, the conflict between the two legal systems does not end in the 
described stalemate. In April 2020 the ECJ has issued an interim order in the 
infringement procedure which the European Commission has initiated against Poland 
(Order in the case Case C-791 Commission v Poland 2020). In the order, the ECJ 
suspended the operation of the Disciplinary Chamber until the ECJ issues a judgement 
in the main procedure (Order in the case C-719/19 Commission v Poland 2020). 
In reaction to the interim order, the Polish government again challenged the 
competence of the ECJ in the case. The government’s spokesman announced that the 
Polish Prime Minister would apply to the Constitutional Tribunal for a decision on the 
matter (“Reakcja premiera na decyzję TSUE” 2020).  
8 The Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal sits at the top of the Polish judiciary and issues 
judgements which are universally binding and final (The Constitution of the Republic 
of Poland 1997 Art. 190 (1)). The CT had issued a judgement which follows the line 
adopted by the German Federal Constitutional Court in its Maastricht case and set a 
domestic limit to the principle of primacy of European law (Madsen and Hofmann 
2018). In the judgement from 2010, the CT stated that the Polish Constitution remains 
the highest law of Poland (Case K 32/09 Traktat z Lizbony 2010). Consequently, the 
Polish CT, similar to its German counterpart, can exceptionally verify whether an act 
of the European institutions contravenes the specific empowerment assigned to them 




by the European Treaties. However, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal from 2010 was 
very different from the CT of 2019. 
The court-packing applied by PiS to the CT delegitimises the latter as a judicial 
institution (Sadurski 2019, 58–95). Since 2015 PiS prevented legally elected members 
of the Tribunal from taking office: the Polish President did not accept their oath in a 
violation of the country's Constitution. PiS illegally "invalidated" the election of these 
judges by the previous Parliament and elected other candidates for the already 
occupied vacancies at the Tribunal. The Polish President hastily took the oaths of these 
candidates in the late-night hours to outrun a judgment by the CT on the legality of 
these re-elections (Sadurski 2019, 58–95). A legally doubtful capture of the office of 
the President of the Tribunal by a PiS-supported candidate followed. This President of 
the CT then illegally removed the CT’s vice-president by sending him on holidays for 
several months (Sadurski 2019, 63–68). Consecutively, PiS used its majority in the 
Polish Parliament to elect "own people" to fill the vacancies which later appeared  at 
the Tribunal. Adding insult to injury, in December 2019 the Polish Parliament elected 
two of the most active PiS hardliners to join the court as its judges. These candidates 
– Krystyna Pawłowicz and Stanisław Piotrowski – had initially been responsible for 
preparing the “reform” of the judiciary by PiS. Consequently, by January 2020, 14 out 
of 15 judges have been nominated by PiS. 
The functioning of the CT after its capture is also legally doubtful. The PiS-nominated 
President of the CT is known to have been manipulating (as long as this was necessary) 
the compositions of the panels to dominate them by judges nominated by PiS 
(Sadurski 2019, 69). At the same time, the bias in the works of the Tribunal towards 
PiS is obvious. The CT, on numerous occasions, has demonstrated active support for 
PiS, facilitated its initiatives and accepted laws inconsistent with the institution's 
settled case-law (Sadurski 2019, 69). The publicly admitted friendship of the CT's 
President and Jarosław Kaczyński (the political leader of PiS) fulfils the image of the 
court as a political extension of PiS (“Jarosław Kaczyński: Julia Przyłębska to Moje 
Towarzyskie Odkrycie” 2019). 
In the context of the A.K. judgement, the described characteristics of the Tribunal raise 
legitimate doubts regarding the body's impartiality and independence. Consequently, 
in the language of the A.K. judgement, the Tribunal cannot be "seen to be independent 
or impartial with the consequence of prejudicing the trust which justice in a 
democratic society must inspire in subjects of the law” (Case C-585/18, A.K. and 
Others v Sąd Najwyższy 2019, para. 171). The lack of impartiality and independence of 
the Constitutional Tribunal preclude the CT from judging cases which involve, or may 
involve, European law. Still, the CT will most likely hand down a judgement declaring 
the ECJ’s involvement with the Polish court “reform” ultra vires. This step leads then 
to an infringement procedure against Poland on the side of the EU. 
9 The logic of the conflict with member states’ top courts 
Hitherto, the European Commission and the ECJ have shown remarkable restraint in 
dealing with national highest courts and tolerated the rare cases of their rebellious 
attitude regarding the primacy of European law (O’Sullivan 2018). However, these 
situations involved genuine national judicial institutions in a relatively insignificant 
context. Examples include the Czech Constitutional Court refusing, in 2012, to accept 





Czechoslovakia (Madsen and Hofmann 2018, 265). In another case, the Danish 
Supreme Court resisted ECJ ruling in a proceeding regarding the application of the 
principle of EU law prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of age (Madsen, Olsen, 
and Šadl 2017). In the case Tarrico, the Italian Constitutional Court disagreed with the 
ECJ preliminary ruling regarding Italian limitation laws in the area of tax fraud 
prosecution (O’Sullivan 2018). The case of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal would 
be qualitatively different from the mentioned cases for several reasons. 
Firstly, the judgement of the CT would protect a clear violation of the rule of law and 
the advancement of an authoritarian regime. This process does not compare to the 
relatively minor questions of pension payments (Czechia), age discrimination in a 
horizontal setting (Denmark) or limitation period (Italy). As much as the ECJ could 
tolerate the non-compliance in these cases, the Polish situation relates to the very 
foundations of the European legal system and directly affects the dispersed system of 
law enforcement through the member states' courts. 
Secondly, the ECJ and the Commission have exercised caution regarding the 
infringements of European law performed by the judicial bodies because of the respect 
for the principle of judicial independence (Madsen and Hofmann 2018). The 
infringement procedures address the member state’s governments and thus imply that 
they can rectify the breach of law which the procedure challenges, possibly limiting 
judicial independence. However, this reason for the restraint does not apply to the 
Polish CT: The CT is neither independent nor impartial in the first place. 
The third reason for the exceptional nature of the situation is the dependence of the 
CT on the Polish government. The European Treaties based the EU’s system of the 
Judiciary on judicial cooperation between the courts, in which the courts treat each 
other as partners in applying the law. Because of the composition and the operations 
of the CT, the latter no longer is such a partner. To the contrary, it constitutes a tool of 
governmental control within the judiciary, aimed at dismantling the influence of 
European law on the Polish system. Consequently, an open judicial conflict with this 
body is in the interest of securing the rule of law in the EU. 
10 The infringement procedure 
On the 10th of October 2019, the European Commission triggered an infringement 
procedure against Poland ‘to protect judges in Poland from political control’ (“Rule of 
Law: European Commission launches infringement procedure to protect judges in 
Poland from political control” 2019). In the procedure, the Commission stated that the 
current Polish law subjected court judges to disciplinary sanctions which impede the 
exercise of their rights under Art. 267 TFEU (a preliminary reference to the ECJ)10. 
Furthermore, the Commission highlighted the lack of independence and impartiality 
of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court and its extensive powers leading to 
an impediment of the judges' independence. 
The ongoing fight of the government (and potentially the Constitutional Tribunal) 
against the application of the judgement A.K. in Poland constitutes a separate ground 
for an infringement procedure closely related to the one initiated by the Commission. 
As mentioned above, this is because these actions are an infringement of the obligation 
 
10 In this procedures domestic courts of member states may request the ECJ to give an opinion (preliminary 
ruling) on the interpretation of European law. 




of sincere cooperation from Art. 4 (3) TEU, and respective rules relating directly to the 
functioning of the judiciary. 
After ECJ hands down a judgement in the infringement procedure, the member states 
should implement it and rectify the breach. If the member state fails to do so, the 
Commission may initiate the sanctioning mechanism from Art. 260 (2) TFEU. In this 
procedure, the European Commission may bring a case before the ECJ if it considers 
that the Member State concerned has not taken the necessary measures to comply with 
the judgment of the court. The European Commission shall specify the amount of the 
lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member State concerned which it 
considers appropriate in the circumstances. Should the Court declare that the member 
state indeed has not complied with the judgement, it may impose the lump sum or 
penalty both separately and cumulatively. 
The European Commission can execute the fines from the financial benefits Poland is 
receiving from the EU. As these payments are still significant, the sanctions could have 
a chilling effect on the Polish economy. Furthermore, the imposition of a penalty 
payment justified by the capture of the judiciary would have profound political 
meaning: It would demonstrate to the Polish population that the policies of its 
government are causing direct damage to the nation's wellbeing. However, it remains 
to be seen whether the sanctions rectify the situation in Poland or merely strengthen 
the tension surrounding the authoritarian transformation of the country. 
11 Conclusion 
The Polish rule of law debacle challenges the European system and tests its political 
resistance to the lawlessness of an authoritarian state. The A.K. ruling provides for a 
significant escalation of this conflict. The ECJ indirectly challenged the lawfulness of 
the Polish court-packing which leads to a delegitimisation of the politicised judicial 
bodies. Furthermore, the A.K. judgement creates a systemic threat to the political 
control over the Polish judiciary even in the purely domestic context, as all European 
courts potentially apply European law and should be independent and impartial. Thus, 
Polish and European judges are empowered and obliged to refrain from cooperating 
with such institutions as the Polish NCJ, the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme 
Court or the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. 
The development of the described conflict depends on the attitude and courage of the 
Polish judges. The ECJ has empowered them to reject cooperation with already 
captured judicial bodies. Yet, such disobedience may expose the judges to significant 
personal risks applied through the system of disciplinary responsibility. Consequently, 
the situation reveals a weakness of the European project consisting of a lack of 
enforcement mechanisms, independent of the member states. 
Considering the unambiguously adverse and assertive reaction of the Polish 
authorities to the A.K. judgement and its implementation, the breach of European law 
perpetuated by Poland is likely to continue. The Polish authorities have indicated their 
next steps in this conflict which consist in strengthening the system of oppressing non-
compliant judges and using the Constitutional Tribunal to enhance the standing of 
Poland vis a vis the ECJ. However, this will expose the fact that the CT itself is not a 
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